Abstract. In the setting of unconditionally-secure MPC, where dishonest players are unbounded and no cryptographic assumptions are used, it was known since the 1980's that an honest majority of players is both necessary and sufficient to achieve privacy and correctness, assuming secure point-to-point and broadcast channels. The main open question that was left is to establish the exact communication complexity. We settle the above question by showing an unconditionally-secure MPC protocol, secure against a dishonest minority of malicious players, that matches the communication complexity of the best known MPC protocol in the honest-but-curious setting. More specifically, we present a new n-player MPC protocol that is secure against a computationally-unbounded malicious adversary that can adaptively corrupt up to t < n/2 of the players. For polynomially-large binary circuits that are not too unshaped, our protocol has an amortized communication complexity of O(n log n + κ/n const ) bits per multiplication (i.e. AND) gate, where κ denotes the security parameter and const ∈ Z is an arbitrary non-negative constant. This improves on the previously most efficient protocol with the same security guarantee, which offers an amortized communication complexity of O(n 2 κ) bits per multiplication gate. For any κ polynomial in n, the amortized communication complexity of our protocol matches the O(n log n) bit communication complexity of the best known MPC protocol with passive security. We introduce several novel techniques that are of independent interest and we believe will have wider applicability. One is a novel idea of computing authentication tags by means of a mini MPC, which allows us to avoid expensive double-sharings; the other is a batch-wise multiplication verification that allows us to speedup Beaver's "multiplication triples".
Introduction
Background. In secure multiparty computation (MPC), a set of n players wish to evaluate an arbitrary but fixed function F on private inputs. The function F is known to all the players and it is typically given as an arithmetic circuit C over some finite field F. It should be guaranteed that the inputs remain private and at the same time that the output of the computation is correct, even in the presence of an adversary that can corrupt a certain number t of the players. In case of a passive adversary, corrupt players simply reveal all their information to the adversary but otherwise keep following the protocol specification; in case of an active adversary, a corrupt player is under full control of the adversary and may arbitrarily misbehave during the protocol execution. By default, the goal is to obtain security against an active adversary.
The problem of MPC was initially introduced by Yao [23] , with the first generic solutions presented in [17, 9] . These first protocols offered cryptographic (aka. computational) security, meaning that the adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded, and can tolerate up to t < n/2 corrupt players. Subsequently, it was shown in [8, 5] that in a setting with perfectly-secure point-to-point communication and with up to t < n/3 corrupt players, MPC is possible with unconditional and even perfect security. 1 Finally, in [21, 1] it was shown that if a secure broadcast primitive is given -in addition to the secure point-to-point communication -then unconditionally (but not perfectly) secure MPC is possible against up to t < n/2 corrupt players.
These early results showed that MPC is possible in principle (in different settings), but they perform rather poorly in terms of communication complexity, i.e., the number of bits that the players need to communicate throughout the protocol. Over the years, a lot of effort has been put into improving the communication complexity of MPC protocols. The table in Figure 1 shows recent achievements and the state of the art in the settings t < n/2 (cryptographic or with broadcast) and t < n/3 (perfect or unconditional, without broadcast). Additional efficiency improvements are possible if one is willing to sacrifice on the resilience and lower the corruption threshold t by a small constant fraction, as shown in [13, 15, 14] . Indeed, lowering t enables to apply several powerful tools, like packed secret sharing or committee selection. We do not consider this option here, but aim for optimal resilience.
Adv Resilience
Security Communication Ref passive t < n/2 perfect O(cM n log n + n 2 log n)
[16] active t < n/2 cryptographic O(cM n 2 κ + n 3 κ) [19] active t < n/2 cryptographic O(cM nκ + n 3 κ) [20] active t < n/2 cryptographic O(cM n log n) + poly(nκ) [16] active t < n/3 unconditional O(cM n 2 κ) + poly(nκ) [18] active t < n/3 unconditional O(cM n log n + dM n 2 log n) + poly(nκ) [16] active t < n/3 perfect O(cM n log n + dM n 2 log n + n 3 log n) [4] active t < n/2 unconditional O(cM n 5 κ + n 4 κ) + O(cM n 5 κ)BC [10] active t < n/2 unconditional O(cM n 2 κ + n 5 κ 2 ) + O(n 3 κ)BC [3] Fig. 1 . Comparison of recent MPC protocols for binary circuits. n denotes the number of players, κ the security parameter (which we assume to be ≥ log n), cM the number of multiplication gates in the circuit (which we assume dominates the number of in-and outputs), and dM the multiplicative depth of the circuit. The communication complexity counts the number of bits that are communicated in total in an execution, plus, in the setting where a broadcast primitive is needed, the number of bits broadcasted. For circuits over a larger field F, the log n-terms should be replaced by log(max{n, |F|}).
We can see from Figure 1 that there is a significant discrepancy between the cryptographic setting with t < n/2, or, similarly, the unconditional/perfect setting with t < n/3, versus the unconditional setting with t < n/2. In the former, MPC is possible for binary circuits with a near-linear amortized communication complexity of O(n log n) bits per multiplication gate. 2 In the latter, the best known protocol has an amortized communication complexity of O(n 2 κ) bits per multiplication gate. This is not very surprising, since it is probably fair to say that the unconditional setting with t < n/2 is the most difficult one to deal with. The reason is that no cryptographic tools can be used, like commitments or signatures, as in the cryptographic setting, nor can we use techniques from error correcting codes, as in the case t < n/3. Therefore, achieving near-linear amortized communication complexity for the setting of unconditional security and t < n/2 has remained a challenging open problem.
We note that, in any of the three settings, O(n log n) bits per multiplication gate seems to be hard to beat, since not even the best known protocol with passive security [16] does better than that.
Our Result. For an arbitrary arithmetic circuit over a finite field F, we show a novel MPC protocol with unconditional security and corruption threshold t < n/2, which has a communication complexity of O(c M (nφ+ κ) + d M n 2 κ + n 7 κ) bits plus O(n 3 κ) broadcasts, where φ = max{log n, log |F|}. Hence, for binary circuits that are not too "narrow" (meaning that the multiplicative depth d M is sufficiently smaller than the number of multiplication gates), our protocol achieves an amortized communication complexity of O(n log n + κ) bits per multiplication gate. Furthermore, for any non-negative constant const ∈ Z, a small modification to our protocol gives O(n log n + κ/n const ) bits per multiplication gate, so that if κ = O(n const+1 ), i.e., κ is at most polynomial in n, we obtain an amortized communication complexity of O(n log n) bits. Thus, our results show that even in the challenging setting of unconditional security with t < n/2, near-linear MPC is possible. Unless there is an additional improvement in the passive setting, this pretty much settles the question of the asymptotic complexity of unconditionally-secure MPC.
We would like to point out that the restriction on the multiplicative depth of the circuit, necessary for the claimed near-linear communication complexity per multiplication gate to hold, is also present in the easier t < n/3 setting for the protocols with near-linear communication complexity [16, 4] ; whether it is an inherent restriction is not known.
Techniques. We borrow several techniques from previous constructions of efficient MPC protocols. For instance, we make use of the dispute control technique introduced in [3] , and the (near) linear passively-secure multiplication technique from [16] . However, our new protocol and its near-linear amortized communication complexity is to a great extent due to two new techniques, which we briefly discuss here. More details will be given in Section 2.7 and Section 3.2.
Efficient batch verification of multiplication triples. The first technique allows to efficiently verify that a large list of N shared multiplication-triples are correct, i.e., satisfy the required multiplicative relation. These multiplication triples are used in order to implement Beaver's method of evaluating multiplication gates, and our new protocol allows us to guarantee all N triples in one shot using communication complexity that is (nearly) independent of N .
Our new technique is inspired by a method that plays an important role in the construction of PCP proofs. Given oracle access to three sequences of bits, or elements from a "small" finite field, a 1 , . . . , a N , b 1 , . . . , b N and c 1 , . . . , c N , we wish to verify that a i · b i = c i for all i = 1, . . . , N . The procedure should be query-efficient, i.e., (much) more efficient than when querying and verifying all triples. Suppose the triples are encoded as low-degree polynomials. This means, we are given oracle access to evaluations of polynomials f and g of degree < N and h of degree < 2N − 1, with f (
. . , N }, where x 1 , . . . , x N are fixed disjoint points and h is supposed to be h = f · g. The key observation is this: by the fundamental theorem of algebra, if f · g = h then f (σ) · g(σ) = h(σ) except with probability at most
|K| for a randomly chosen σ ∈ K, and for any suitably large extension field K.
In our setting, it will turn out that we can indeed enforce the shared multiplication triples to be encoded via low-degree polynomials as above. So, by the above technique, it is possible to verify N multiplication triples with just one (random) query to f, g and h, and thus with a communication complexity that essentially only depends on the aspired error probability.
In independent work [12] , Cramer et al. propose a 2-party batch zero-knowledge proof for committed multiplication triples. The techniques used there show some resemblance, but there are also differences due to the fact that in our setting, the a i , b i and c i 's are not known to any party.
Multiparty-computing the authentication tags Our other technique is a new way to "commit" the players to their shares, so that dishonest players who lie about their shares during reconstruction are caught. This is necessary in the setting t < n/2, where plain Shamir shares do not carry enough redundancy to reconstruct in the presence of incorrect shares. The way we "commit" player P i to his share σ i is by attaching an authentication tag τ to σ i , where the corresponding authentication key is held by some other player V , acting as verifier. 3 The reader may think of τ as τ = µ · σ i + ν over some large finite field, where (µ, ν) forms the key. It is well known and easy to see that if P i does not know the key (µ, ν), then he is not able to come up with σ i = σ i and τ such that τ = µ · σ i + ν, except with small probability. Thus, incorrect shares can be detected and filtered out.
This idea is not new, and actually goes back to [21] , but in all previous work the tag τ is locally computed by some party, usually the dealer that prepared the share σ i . Obviously, this requires that the dealer knows the key (µ, ν); otherwise, he cannot compute τ = µ · σ i + ν. As a consequence, if the dealer is dishonest, the authentication tag τ is useless, because with the knowledge of the key, an authentication tag τ for an incorrect share σ i can easily be forged. In previous work, as in [21, 10, 3] , this problem was overcome by means of a double sharing, where every share σ i is again shared, and the authentication tags are attached to the second-level shares. However, such a double sharing obviously leads to a (at least) quadratic communication complexity.
Instead, here we propose to compute the tag τ by means of a mini MPC, to which P i provides his share σ i as input, and V his key (µ, ν), and the tag τ is securely computed jointly by all the players. This way, no one beyond V learns the key (µ, ν), and forging a tag remains hard, and no expensive double sharing is necessary.
At first glance this may look hopeless since MPC typically is very expensive, and we cannot expect to increase the efficiency of MPC by using an expensive MPC as subprotocol. What saves us is that our mini MPC is for a very specific function in a very specific setting. We use several tricks, like re-using parts of the authentication key, batching etc., to obtain a tailored mini MPC for computing the tag τ , with an amortized communication complexity that has no significant impact. One of the crucial new tricks is to make use of the fact that Shamir's secret sharing scheme is "symmetric" in terms of what is the shared secret and what are the shares; this allows us to avoid having to re-share the share σ i for the mini MPC, but instead we can use the other shares σ j as shares of σ i .
2 Near-Linear MPC: Our Result and Approach
Communication and Corruption Model
We consider a set of n = 2t + 1 players P 1 , . . . , P n , which are connected by means of a complete network of secure synchronous communication channels. Additionally, we assume a broadcast channel, available to all the players. For simplicity, we assume the broadcast channel to broadcast single bits; longer messages are broadcasted bit-wise. For a protocol that instructs the players to communicate (in total) X bits and to broadcast Y bits, we say that the protocol has communication complexity X + Y · BC.
We consider a computationally-unbounded active adversary that can adaptively corrupt up to t of the players. Adaptivity means that the adversary can corrupt players during the execution of the protocol, and depending on the information gathered so far. Once a player is corrupted, the adversary learns the internal state of the player, which consists of the complete history of that player, and takes over full control of that player and can make him deviate from the protocol in any desired manner.
For any given arithmetic circuit C over a finite field F, the goal is to have a protocol that permits the n players to securely evaluate C on their private inputs. For simplicity, we assume that all the players should learn the entire result. Security means that the adversary cannot influence the result of the computation more than by selecting the inputs for the corrupt players, and the adversary should learn nothing about the uncorrupt players' inputs beyond what can be deduced from the result of the computation. This should hold unconditionally, meaning without any computational restrictions on the adversary, and up to a negligible failure probability ε.
Main Result
For an arithmetic circuit C over a finite field F, we denote the respective numbers of input, output, addition, and multiplication gates in C by c I , c O , c A , and c M , and we write c tot = c I + c O + c M (not counting c A ). Furthermore, we write d M to denote its multiplicative depth, i.e., the maximal number of multiplication gates on any path from an input gate to an output gate. Theorem 1. For every n, κ ∈ N, and for every arithmetic circuit C over a finite field F with |F| ≤ 2 κ+n , there exists an n-party MPC protocol that securely computes C against an unbounded active adaptive adversary corrupting up to t < n/2 players, with failure probability ε ≤ O(c tot n)/2 κ and communication
where φ = max{log |F|, log n}. More generally, for any const ∈ Z, there exists such an n-party MPC protocol with communication complexity
Theorem 1 guarantees that for large enough circuits that are not too "narrow", meaning that the multiplicative depth d M is significantly smaller than the number c M of multiplication gates (e.g. d M ≤ c M /(nκ) is good enough), the communication complexity per multiplication gate (assuming that c M dominates c I , c O and c R ) is O(nφ+κ/n const ) bits, i.e., O(n log n+κ/n const ) for binary circuits, for an arbitrary non-negative const ∈ Z. Recall, the best previous MPC scheme in this setting [3] required O(n 2 κ) bits per multiplication gate. For simplicity, we focus on the case const = 0 and merely give some indication on how to adapt the same for larger const.
The Set Up
We are given positive integers n and κ, and an arithmetic circuit C over a finite field F. We assume that |F| ≥ 2n 2 (or |F| ≥ 2n 2+const for an arbitrary const) -otherwise we consider C over an appropriate extension field 4 -and we write φ = log(|F|), i.e., φ denotes the number of bits needed to represent an element in F. We may assume that κ ≥ n (otherwise, we set κ = n) and thus that κ is an integer multiple of n. We fix an extension field K of F such that |K| ≥ 2 2(κ+n) . Finally, we set M = 2(c M + c O + c I ). As convention, we write elements in F as Roman letters, and elements in K as Greek letters. Note that F is naturally a subset of K, and thus for s ∈ F and λ ∈ K, the product λ · s is a well defined element in K. Also note that by fixing an F-linear bijection F e → K, where e is the extension degree e = [K : F] we can understand a vector (s 1 , . . . , s e ) ∈ F e as a field element σ ∈ K, and a vector (s 1 , . . . , s q·e ) ∈ F q·e for q ∈ N as a vector σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ q ) ∈ K q of q field elements in K.
Dispute Control
We make use of the dispute control framework due to Beerliová-Trubíniová and Hirt. The idea of dispute control is to divide (the different phases of) the MPC protocol into n 2 segments (of equal "size"), and to execute the segments sequentially. If the execution of a segment should fail due to malicious behavior of some corrupt parties, then two players are identified that are in dispute and of which at least one must be corrupt. Then, the failed segment is freshly re-executed, but now in such a way that the two players in dispute will not be able to get into dispute anymore, during this segment and during all the remaining segments. This ensures that overall there can be at most n 2 disputes (actually fewer, because two uncorrupt players will never get into a dispute), and therefore at most n 2 times a segment needs to be re-executed. This means that overall there are at most 2n 2 executions of a segment.
We will show that (if d M is small enough) any segment of size m = M/n 2 can be executed with bit communication complexity O m(nφ + κ) + n 5 κ) + O(nκ) · BC; it thus follows that the communication complexity of the overall scheme is 2n
, which amounts to O(nφ + κ) bits per multiplication gate for large enough circuits.
A dispute between two players P i and P j typically arises when player P j claims to have received message msg from P i whereas P i claims that he had actually sent msg = msg to P j . In order to ensure that two players P i and P j in dispute will not get into a new dispute again, they will not communicate anymore with each other. This is achieved by means of the following two means:
(1) If P i is supposed to share a secret w and distribute the shares to the players, then he chooses the sharing polynomial so that P j 's share w j vanishes, and thus there is no need to communicate the share, P j just takes w j = 0 as his share. Using the terminology from [3] , we call such a share that is enforced to be 0 a Kudzu share (see also Section 2.5). (2) For other messages that P i needs to communicate to P j , he sends to P j via a relay: the first player P r that is not in dispute with P i and not with P j .
In order to keep track of the disputes and the players that were caught cheating, the players maintain two sets, Corr and Disp, which at the beginning of the execution are both initialized to be empty. Whenever the players jointly identify a player P i to be corrupt, then P i is added to Corr. Additionally, {P i , P j } will be added to Disp for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Whenever there is a dispute between two players P i and P j , so that one of them must be corrupt but it cannot be resolved which of the two, then {P i , P j } is added to Disp. Whenever a player P i is in dispute with more than t players, then he must be corrupt and is added to Corr (and Disp is updated accordingly). We write Disp i for the set of all players P j with {P i , P j } ∈ Disp. Players that are in dispute (with some other players) still take part in the protocol, but they do not communicate anymore with each other. Players in Corr, i.e., players that have been identified to be corrupt, are excluded from (the remainder of) the protocol execution. We do not always make this explicit in the description of the protocol when we quantify over all players but actually mean all players not in Corr. Also, we do not make it always explicit but understand it as clear that whenever a new dispute is found, the remainder of the execution of the current segment is skipped, and the segment is freshly executed with the updated Disp (and Corr).
The Different Sharings
We will be using different variants and extensions of Shamir's secret sharing scheme [22] . We introduce here these different versions and the notation that we will be using for the remainder of the paper. We consider the field F from Section 2.3, and fix distinct elements x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ F with x 0 = 0. We also fix an additional 2n 2 − n − 1 elements x n+1 , . . . , x 2n 2 −1 with the property that every pair x i , x j with i = j ∈ {0, . . . , 2n 2 − 1} is disjoint; these additional elements will be used later on. It may be convenient to view the different kinds of sharings we introduce below as different data structures for representing an element w ∈ F by data held among the players.
-A degree-t (Shamir) sharing of w ∈ F consists of n shares w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ F of the following form: there exists a sharing polynomial f (X) ∈ F[X] of degree at most t such that w = f (0) and w j = f (x j ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, share w j is held by player P j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote such a sharing as [w] . If a designated player P d (e.g. the dealer) knows all the shares, and thus also w, we indicate this by denoting the sharing as (Shamir) sharing of w ∈ F is defined as the degree-t sharing above, except that the degree of the sharing polynomial f is at most 2t. We write w for such a sharing, and w d for such a sharing when P d knows all the shares. -A twisted degree-t sharing of w ∈ F with respect to player P i , denoted as w i , consists of n − 1 shares w 1 , ..., w i−1 , w i+1 , ..., w n ∈ F, of the following form: there exists a sharing polynomial f (X) ∈ F[X] of degree at most t such that w = f (x i ), f (0) = 0, and w j = f (x j ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i}.
5 Share w j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i} is known to player P j . We write w i d for such a sharing when P d knows all the shares.
-A twisted degree-2t sharing of w ∈ F with respect to P i , denoted as w i respectively w i d when P d knows all the shares, is defined as the twisted degree-t sharing above, except that the degree of the sharing polynomial f is at most 2t. Figure 2 , center left). We point out that the second level shares w i (d) can be understood as Shamir shares of the sum-shares w(d) of w, as well as sum-shares of the Shamir shares w i of w.
-A two-level (degree-2t/sum) sharing w is defined similar to above as w = ( w(1) 1 , ..., w(n) n ) with
The above list merely specifies the structures of the different sharings, but does not address privacy. In our scheme, the different sharings will be prepared in such a way that the standard privacy requirement holds: the shares of any t players reveals no information on the shared secret. In the case of a twisted sharing w i , privacy is slightly more subtle. Because player P i is given no share, but, on the other hand, the sharing polynomial vanishes at 0, privacy will only hold in case P i is (or gets) corrupted, so that the t corrupted players miss one polynomial evaluation; this will be good enough for our purpose.
We note that the players can, by means of local computations, perform certain computations on the sharings. For instance, by linearity of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, it follows that if the players locally add their shares of a degree-t sharing 
Furthermore, locally multiplying the shares of two degree-t shared secrets results in a degree-2t sharing of the product:
Finally, locally multiplying the shares [v] of an ordinarily degree-t shared secret with the shares w i of a twisted degree-t shared secret results in a twisted degree-2t sharing of the product of
This property of a twisted sharing is of crucial importance to us; thus, we encourage the reader to verify this claim.
We point out that opening such a product of sharings,
, reveals more information on v and w than just their product. This will be of no concern to us, because in our scheme, such sharings will only be opened in the form of u + v · w = u + [v] · [w], i.e., when masked with a random degree-2t sharing, which ensures that no information on u, v, w is revealed beyond u + v · w.
Borrowing the terminology from [3] , we say that a sharing [s] d has Kudzu shares, if the share s j of every player P j that currently is in Disp d is set to s j = 0, i.e., the sharing polynomial f (x) is such that f (x j ) = 0 for every , viewed as an element in K and with shares σ i ∈ K, by means of a sharing polynomial f (X) ∈ K[X], but with the same interpolation points x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ F ⊆ K.
Protocol Overview
The protocol consists of three phases: the preparation phase, the input phase, and the computation phase. We briefly discuss (the goal of) these three phases here. As discussed in Section 2.4, every phase will be performed in segments; and whenever a segment fails, then a new dispute is found and added to Disp, and the segment is re-executed.
Preparation Phase. In this phase, the following data structure is prepared. 
Although there are dependencies among the second-level shares of different w ∈ ∪M (which means we have to pay special attention when revealing those, or the local base sharings), it will be the case that the first-level Shamir sharings [w] are independent among all w ∈ ∪M.
Authentication tags: For every player
, and every player P V (acting as verifier), the following holds. P V holds a random long-term authentication key µ ∈ K q and a random one-time authentication key ν ∈ K, and P i holds the
We will often use set-notation for lists: for a list L = ( 1, . . . , m), the expression ∈ L is to be understood as i for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Also, ∈L u should be understood as m i=1 ui i. 8 As a consequence, even though every player implicitly holds in total 3M n subshares of the w ∈ ∪M, he only needs to explicitly store n · L = O(M ) values. Thus, to communicate all these subshares (for all the players), only O(M n) elements in F need to be communicated, i.e., a linear number per multiplication triple. 9 We silently assume here that the fraction L/(n 3 e) is an integer, and we will similarly do so for a few other fractions later. We may always do so without loss of generality.
where denotes the standard inner product over K. We stress that ν and, consequently, τ are fresh for every
, and every P i and P V , but µ is somewhat re-used: P V uses the same µ for every P d (but fresh µ's for different P i 's) and for n out of the
This data structure is illustrated in Figure 2 .
. . .
. . . The purpose of the authentication tags (and keys) is to be able to identify an incorrect share σ i (d) claimed by a corrupt player P i . Indeed, it is well known (and goes back to Carter and Wegman [7] ) that if the adversary has no information on µ beyond knowing the tags τ for several σ i (d) with fresh one-time keys ν, then the probability for the adversary to produce
. Informally, this means that with the given data structure, a dishonest player P i will not be able to lie about his share σ i (d) without being caught.
The use of authentication tags to (try to) commit players to their (sub)share is not new. What distinguishes our approach from previous work is that here the tag τ will be computed in a multi-party fashion so that no one beyond the verifier P V knows the corresponding key. This gives us the decisive advantage over previous work.
Input Phase. For every player P i , and for every input x ∈ F of that player to the circuit, a fresh multiplication triple ( a , b , c ) is chosen from M, and a is reconstructed towards P i . Then P i announces d = x − a, and the players compute the sharing x = d + a . The used triple ( a , b , c ) is then removed from M.
Essentially the only thing corrupt players can do to disrupt the computation phase, is to provide incorrect shares when P i is supposed to reconstruct some shared a. However, because every [a(d)] d is a linear combination of the local base sharings [s(d)] d , and because players are committed to their local base sharings (block-wise) by means of the authentication tags, players that hand in incorrect shares can be caught.
Computation Phase. The actual computation is done in a gate-by-gate fashion. To start with, we say that the input values are computed. Then, inductively, for every gate in the circuit whose input values have already been computed, the corresponding output value of the gate is computed. This is done as follows. Let x and y be the sharings of the input values to the gate. If the gate is an addition gate, then the output value is computed locally as z = x + y = x + y . If the gate is a multiplication gate, then the output value is computed by using Beavers technique [2] as follows. A fresh multiplication triple a , b , c is selected and the differences x − a = x − a and y − b = y − b are reconstructed. Then, the output value of the gate is computed locally as
In the end, once the output values of the circuit have been computed, they are reconstructed.
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Essentially the only thing corrupt players can do to disrupt the computation phase, is to provide incorrect shares when the players (try to) reconstruct a shared value w . Since the latter is a linear combination of sharings in ∪M so that every [w(d)] d is a linear combination of the local base sharings [s(d)] d , and because players are committed to their local base sharings (block-wise) by the authentication tags, players that hand in incorrect shares can be caught.
Two New Essential Ingredients
We present here the two main new components that enable our improved communication complexity.
Batch-wise Multiplication Verification. Assume we have two sharings [a] and [b] (over F)
, and the players have computed a sharing [c], which is supposed to be c = a · b, using an optimistic multiplication protocol (i.e., one that assumes that players behave). And now the players want to verify that indeed c = a · b, without revealing anything beyond about a, b, c. The standard way of doing so (see e.g. [11] or [3] ) has a failure probability of 1/|F|, which is too large for us, or when performed over the bigger field K, has a sufficiently small failure probability of 1/|K|, but requires to share an element from K for every triple to be verified. This means we get a communication complexity of at least O(nκ) bits per multiplication gate, whereas we want O(nφ + κ).
We achieve the latter by verifying c = a · b batch-wise. This is done by means of the following method. Let
be N = n 2 multiplication triples that need to be verified. Consider the degree-(N − 1) polynomials f and g with f (x k ) = a k and g(x k ) = b k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and set a k := f (x k ) and 
It now holds that all the multiplication triples are correct -i.e., that Multiparty Computation of the Tags. As mentioned before, the tags τ should be computed in a multiparty fashion, without blowing up the asymptotic communication complexity. To simplify the exposition here, we assume for the moment that each tag τ is computed as τ = µ · σ i (d) + ν for µ ∈ K, and where
. A first step in a multi-party computation usually is to share the inputs; here: µ, σ i (d) and ν. However, this blows up the communication complexity by a factor n, which we cannot afford. Note that sharing µ is actually okay, since the µ's are (partly) re-used, and thus we can also re-use their sharings. Also, sharing ν is okay, since in the actual authentication scheme we are using (not the simplified version we are discussing here), there is only one ν for many σ i (d)'s. What is problematic, however, is the sharing of σ i (d). And this is where our second new method comes into play. We make use of the fact that σ i (d) is not an arbitrary input to the multi-party computation, but that it is actually a share of a shared secret σ(d). Due to the symmetry of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, we may then view σ i (d) as the secret and the remaining shares σ j (d) as a sharing of σ i (d). Indeed, any t + 1 of the shares σ j (d) can be used to recover σ i (d). Thus, in that sense, σ i (d) is already shared, and there is no need to share it once more.
Using this idea, the players can compute τ in a multi-party way as follows. 12 Player P V , holding µ and ν, shares µ as a twisted degree-t sharing µ 
as explained at the end of Section 2.5. These shares can now be sent to P i for reconstruction (and correctness of τ will be verified by a cut-and-choose technique).
We point out that by corrupting t players P j that do not include P V or P i , the adversary can learn µ from the (twisted) shares of the players in P j . However, in that case, the adversary cannot anymore corrupt player P i , and thus knowledge of µ is of no use. What is important is that the adversary does not learn µ in case it corrupts P i , and this we will show to hold (in the final version of the scheme).
Adapting the above to τ = µ σ i (d) + ν, and re-using µ and its twisted sharing, gives the players the means to compute their tags with a communication complexity that is negligible for large enough circuits. . This technique is borrowed from [16] . Then, c , where c is supposed to be a · b, is computed by means of the passively-secure multiplication protocol due to [16] , which has linear communication complexity. In order to verify the correctness of the c's, we use the batch-wise multiplication verification described in Section 2.7. Using batches of size N = n 2 , verifying the correctness of N multiplication triples essentially boils down to reconstructing a constant number of sharings over the big field K, which consists of every player sending his share (in K
Once the data structure as described in Section 2.6 is prepared, we are in good shape. Essentially, the only thing that can cause problems during the input and the computation phase is that corrupt players hand in incorrect shares; but this will be detected (since the shares then do not lie on a degree-t polynomial), and the corrupt players will be found with the help of the authentication tags (on the local base sharings). The details are explained in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
Detailed Protocol Description
We now present the full protocol description. We stress that the main ingredients to the protocol are the new batch verification for multiplication triples, and to use a mini MPC for computing authentication tags, as discussed earlier in the paper. Fine-tuning everything makes the protocol very involved and probably hard to follow at first look. We suggest to skip at first reading the fault localization subprotocols. They are in fact rather straightforward (the players essentially open up everything in order to locate where things went wrong) but tedious, often with several case distinctions in order to branch through all possibilities, and sometimes not done in the most direct way in order to keep the communication low.
Two Basic Subprotocols
We introduce here two subprotocols that we will use later on several times.
Generating a Challenge. The purpose of the subprotocol Challenge below is to generate a common challenge λ ∈ K with high min-entropy. It makes use of an arbitrary injective mapping convert from {0,
2(κ+n)/n (n times) into K. 13 Its communication complexity is O(κ) · BC.
Protocol Challenge
Every player Pi ∈ Corr chooses and broadcasts a random string stri ∈ {0, 1} 2(κ+n)/n ; for Pi ∈ Corr, stri is set to the all-0 string in {0, 1} 2(κ+n)/n . The field element λ = convert(str1, . . . , strn) ∈ K is taken as the generated challenge.
The following is easy to see.
Fact 1 For any fixed set of t corrupt players 14 and for any given subset S ⊂ K, the probability that a challenge generated by the subprotocol Challenge lies in S is at most |S|/2 2(t+1)(κ+n)/n ≤ |S|/2 κ+n . Verification: By means of Challenge, the players generate a challenge λ ∈ K. Then, for every player PV (acting as verifier), the following is done. Every player Pj ∈ Disp V sends his share σi The 2 n -factor stems from the adaptiveness of the adversary, i.e., that he may corrupt players after having seen the challenge λ; thus, we argue for every possible set of t corrupt players and apply union bound. The claim that a new dispute is found is somewhat tedious but straightforward to verify.
Verified Sharing
The 
The Preparation Phase
The goal of the preparation phase is to prepare a data structure as discussed in Section 2.6. This is done by means of dividing the work into n 2 segments. In each segment seg ∈ {1, . . . , n 2 }, a list M seg of m = M/n 2 multiplication triples ( a , b , c ) is generated, and corresponding lists
. If a segment fails, then a new dispute is added to Disp, the data of the segment is dismissed, and the players retry that segment. In the end, after at most 2n 2 (possibly repeated) segments, the M seg and S seg (d)'s (with the authenticated blocks) are combined to the full size data structure as described in Section 2.6.
In the remainder of this section, we describe how the data structure for a fixed segment seg is prepared. We take it as understood that as soon as a fault is detected, and as a consequence a new dispute is found (which may also mean that a player is identified to be corrupt), the execution of that segment is aborted and re-done.
Base Sharings. First, the players generate m two-level sharings a 1 , . . . , a m with Kudzu shares of random secret values a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ F with underlying local base sharings. This is done by means of the following procedure Base Sharings. It makes use of the fact that the transpose of a Vandermonde matrix acts as a randomness extractor (see e.g. [16] 
Multiplication. Every quadruple ( a , b , r , r ) ∈ M seg is extended to ( a , b , c , r , r ), where c is supposed to be c = a · b, and we call the new (extended) list M seg . This is done by means of the following procedure Mult, which is due to Damgård and Nielsen [16] , and which has a communication complexity of O(nφ) bits per quadruple.
Protocol Mult
Let PK (the "king") be the first player that is not in Corr. Every player Pj sends his share of d = [a][b] + r to PK ; if Pj ∈ Disp K , then Pj sends his share via a relay, i.e., via the first player that is neither in Disp j nor in Disp K . PK then reconstructs d by computing the unique degree-2t polynomial defined by the n shares, and sends d to every player, via a relay for players in Disp K . c is then computed (by means of local computations) as c = d − r .
Fact 4
The adversary learns no information on a and b from executing Mult. Furthermore, in case of no adversarial behavior, the players hold correct two-level shares of c = a · b.
In the end, M seg is obtained by removing the r and r -components from the entries of M seg , but beforehand, the players need to verify the correctness of the c 's: that the sharings are correct, and that indeed c = a · b. This is done as outlined below.
Auxiliary Structures. In order to be able to verify the multiplication triples, i.e., that indeed c = a · b, the players need to produce some additional auxiliary data structures. One is an additional fresh list R Verifying the Multiplication. The standard procedure to verify the correctness of multiplication triples, as for instance used in [10, 11, 3] (see also Single Verify below), which verifies triples on a one-by-one basis, is too expensive for us. We verify the correctness of the multiplication triples in batches of size N = n 2 (or N = n 2+const for a general const).
Protocol Verify
The players execute the following batch verify procedure in parallel for every (disjoint) batch (
∈ M seg of size N = n 2 , using the same challenge σ in all the parallel executions, and the same challenge λ in all the parallel sub-calls to Single Verify. We observe that if a k · b k = c k for some k ∈ {1, . . . , N }, then f · g = h as polynomials (of degree at most 2(N − 1)), and thus there are at most 2N − 1 values σ ∈ K with f (σ) · g(σ) = h(σ). Thus, from Fact 1, and by using union bound over all possible sets of corrupted players, we obtain the following.
Fact 5 For every batch
. . , N }, then the probability that γ is a correct sharing and α · β = γ is at most 2(N − 1)/2 κ .
It remains to show how the players verify the correctness of the multiplication triples ( α , β , γ ). This is done by means of the following standard protocol. 
Protocol Single Verify

Fact 7
The probability that all uncorrupt players P V ∈ Disp K accept Single Verify yet either γ is not a correct sharing or γ = α · β (or both) is at most 2 −κ . If a player P V ∈ Disp K rejects, and fault localization is performed, then a new dispute is found.
If for all the batches Batch Verify succeeds, then the players remove the r and r -components from the entries of M seg to obtain M seg .
Computing the Tags. Finally, we need to "commit" the players to their shares of the local base sharings [s(d)] ∈ S seg (d) (for every P d ) by giving them authentication tags. Specifically, the following needs to be achieved. For every player P V (acting as verifier) and every player P i (the player that needs to be committed to his shares), player P V should obtain a random long-term key µ ∈ K 3m /ne , and for every player P d and every block
, player P V should additionally obtain a random one-time key ν ∈ K and player P i should be given the tag
Recall that σ(d) is obtained as follows. We parse the sharings [
We stress that per segment, every P V has one fixed long-term key µ per player P i (and uses that very same key for the different players P d and the different blocks [σ(d)] d ∈ S seg (d)). The short-term keys and the tags, on the other hand, are fresh for every
What makes the computation of these tags non-trivial, is the fact that no-one beyond P V should learn µ and ν, and no-one beyond P i and P d knows (and may know) σ i (d). This means, no single player can perform the computation, but τ needs to be computed jointly by the players in a multi-party fashion.
For the computation (or, actually, the verification) of the tags, the players will need, for every P d , a random dummy sharing [σ
Preparing these does not increase the asymptotic overall communication complexity.
Protocol TagComp
For every player PV and Pi with {PV , Pi} ∈ Disp, the following is performed.
Key generation: By means of (a straightforward variant of) VerShareV , player PV generates q verified twisted sharings µ
Then, for every PV , Pi, P d with Pi ∈ Disp V ∪ Disp d , and for every of the (n + 1) blocks [σ
Tag computation: The players execute SingleTagComp V,i,d (given below); as a result, PV obtains ν k and Pi obtains τ
Then, the players produce a challenge λ ∈ K by means of Challenge and perform batch verification for every PV , Pi, P d with Pi ∈ Disp V ∪ Disp d .
Batch verification: Pi computes and sends
For every PV , if he accepted batch verification for every Pi ∈ Disp V then he broadcasts "ok", otherwise he broadcasts "fault" together the smallest Pi that he did not accept. For the smallest PV that did not broadcast "ok" and the corresponding Pi, fault localization is performed.
Fault localization: Pi sends τ 1 , . . . , τ n and σ
Then, PV finds and broadcasts the smallest index k ∈ {•, 1, . . . , n} for which τ k = µ σ k i (d)+ν k , and then fault localization for a single tag of SingleTagComp V,i,d is invoked.
Fact 8 If
, and some uncorrupt players P i and P V with P i ∈ Disp d , then, except with probability n/2 κ , the following holds: P V broadcasts "fault", or P i or P V becomes corrupted. If some P V broadcasts "fault", then fault localization for a single tag of SingleTagComp V,i,d will be invoked for some player P d , some block [σ k (d)], and some player
The communication complexity to run key generation for every P V and P i is n 2 ·O(qnκ+n 2 κ) = O(mnφ+n 4 κ) bits plus O(n 2 κ) · BC. By doing the O(n 2 ) executions of key generations in parallel, and using the same challenge in all instances of VerShare, permits to reduce the broadcast complexity at least to O(nκ)·BC. The communication complexity of batch verification for every i, d and V , including fault localization (which is executed at most once), but not counting the call to SingleTagComp, is O(n 3 qκ) = O(mnφ) bits plus O(n) · BC.
It remains to show how the tags are jointly computed by the players. Our description below is for a fixed choice of P V , The one-time key ν and the tag τ are chosen/computed by means of the following subprotocol, unless P i is in dispute with P d or with P V . In the former case, his shares are fixed to 0 anyway, and µ and τ are simply both set to 0, and in the latter, P i and P V accuse each other anyway.
Player PV chooses a random ν ∈ K and shares it (non-verifiably) as ν 
and send their shares to Pi. If Pj ∈ Disp i then Pj sends his share of τ i to Pi via a relay, i.e., via the first player that is not in dispute with both Pi and Pj; for any player Pj ∈ Corr, Pi takes 0 as this player's share. Pi can now compute the unique degree-2t polynomial that fits these shares and obtains τ as the evaluation at xi.
It is easy to verify that if all players follow the protocol, then P i obtains τ = µ σ i +ν (where σ i is determined by 
Proposition 1 (Privacy of the keys). If P V remains honest and the adversary corrupts at most t − 1 players different to P i (which is e.g. satisfied if he eventually corrupts P i ), then the adversary learns no information on µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ q ) and ν, beyond τ = k σ k i µ k + ν (for the correct shares σ k i , defined by the shares of the uncorrupt players).
By the security of the underlying authentication scheme, this guarantees that if at some later point player P i lies about his shares, then he will be caught by P V except with probability 1/|K|. Interestingly, if the adversary corrupts t players not including P i (nor P V ) then he actually learns player P V 's long-term key µ (that P V uses to verify P i 's shares); however, in this case, P i is guaranteed to remain honest and provide correct shares. So, this does not help the adversary.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the claim in case of a corrupt dealer P d and a corrupt player P i , and thus we may assume that the adversary learns the shares of
.e., we may assume that all the shares of o are 0. We understand [σ k ] as the correct sharing of some σ k , determined by the shares of the uncorrupt players. As such, the data structure
, and in particular τ , is well defined, even though the corrupt players may perform additional computations on their shares of µ k and ν. First note that (by assumption) there are at most t − 1 corrupt players P j that hold a (twisted) share of µ k ; thus, the µ k i V 's give away no information on the µ k 's to the adversary. However, this is not sufficient to argue privacy, since the adversary also learns all shares of
V , which potentially may leak additional information on the µ k 's and on ν (beyond τ ). To argue privacy, consider a twisted sharing δ 1 i
V of an arbitrary δ 1 ∈ K, but with the additional property that the shares of all corrupt players are 0. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish the sharing µ
V . Furthermore, the adversary cannot distinguish the
it holds that the adversary has no information on whether µ 1 and ν had been shared (even when given the remaining µ k 's), orμ 1 andν. This means that every pair (µ 1 , ν) with k σ k i µ k + ν = τ is equally likely for the adversary, and similarly one can argue for the other µ k 's.
Proposition 2 (Privacy of the shares). If P d remains honest, then the adversary learns no information on σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ q ).
Proof. The proof goes similar to the proof of Proposition 1. It is sufficient to prove the claim in case both P i and P V become corrupt, and thus we may assume that P i learns the shares of
of an arbitrary δ 1 , but with the additional property that the shares of all corrupt players are 0. Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish the sharing [
V , as both are (twisted) degree-2t sharings of 0 with identical shares for the corrupt players (here we are using that the shares of [µ 1 ]
i V correctly lie on a degree-t polynomial that vanishes at x i ). But now, since
it holds that the adversary has no information on whether σ 1 had been shared (even when given the remaining σ k 's), orσ 1 . This means that every pair σ 1 is equally likely for the adversary, and similarly one can argue for the other σ k 's.
Note that the correctness of τ is verified within the batch verification of TagComp. In case a tag is detected to be incorrect, the following fault localization for a single tag is performed.
Fault localization for a single tag: The shares of µ One More Auxiliary Structure. In order to deal with the dependencies of the second-level shares of the two-level sharings w ∈ ∪M, the players also produce t random and fully independent two-level sharings of zero in the preparation phase. This is done by means of (a straightforward modification of) 
The Input Phase
For every player P i ∈ Corr, and for every input x ∈ F of that player to the circuit, a sharing x needs to be prepared. This job is divided into n 2 segments, where in each segment, m = c I /n 2 such inputs x 1 , . . . , x m are taken care of. We assume for simplicity that for each segment, the corresponding inputs x 1 , . . . , x m belong to one player P i . For the preparation of x 1 , . . . , x m , the players make use of m multiplication triples ( a 1 , b 1 , c 1 ) ∈ M, which are then removed from M. 
Protocol Prepare Inputs
to all the players not in Corr, using a relay for the players in Disp i , broadcasts "ok", and verification is performed.
Verification:
The players generate a challenge λ by means of Challenge, and every player (including Pi) not in Corr
If a player Pj broadcasts a different value than Pi, then fault localization 1 is performed for the smallest such Pj. Otherwise, the players compute x k locally as
. . , m and halt.
Fault localization 1: If {Pi, Pj} ∈ Disp then {Pi, Pj} is added to Disp and Prepare Inputs halts. Otherwise, the relay broadcasts δ, and the relay together with the player that broadcasted a different value are added to Disp, and Prepare Inputs halts. The reason for involving the zero-sharing o ∈ O in fault localization 2 is the following. In order to deal with the inconsistent shares of [a k ], the players need to look at the second-level shares. However, the second-level shares of different secrets are not fully independent, and thus revealing the second-level shares of a k would leak information on other secrets. Therefore, we pad a 
, for the restriction of the linear combination to the sharings in block σ(d).
Protocol AnalyzeSharing
Every player Pj ∈ Corr broadcasts the subshares wj(1), . . . , wj(n) he holds of w . If for some player Pj they do not add up to the share wj, then Pi is declared dishonest and AnalyzeSharing halts. Otherwise, the players proceed as follows. Let d be the smallest number such that the subshares wj(d) do not form a correct Shamir sharing for the players Pj ∈ Corr. If P d ∈ Corr then P d broadcasts the index i of a player Pi ∈ Corr who broadcasted an incorrect subshare wi(d) (note that it may be that {P d , Pi} ∈ Disp). Then, the players check the correctness of wi(d), and thus can identify P d or Pi to be dishonest, by means of fault localization 1, given below. Otherwise, i.e. if P d ∈ Corr, the players engage into fault localization 2 to identify a dishonest player Pi that announced an incorrect share wi(d). If t + 1 or more players PV broadcast "incorrect", then Pi is declared corrupt and added to Corr; else, P d is declared corrupt and added to Corr. Then, AnalyzeSharing halts. 
Now, for every share zi(d) (with Pi ∈ Corr), its correctness is verified as in fault localization 1 by means of check share. The first player whose share is claimed incorrect by t + 1 or more players PV , is declared corrupt and added to Corr.
Fact 11
When AnalyzeSharing is performed on a sharing w for which the players not in Corr have broadcast inconsistent shares [w], then a new corrupt player is identified except with probability n/2 κ . Also, the adversary learns no information beyond what he already knows and/or can simulate himself.
The most expensive part of AnalyzeSharing is fault localization 2. The search involves broadcasting 3n 2 elements in F. Then, invoking check share n times requires O(n 2 · /n) = O(M/n 2 ) elements in F to be communicated and n 2 bits to be broadcasted. Since AnalyzeSharing finds a new corrupt player, and not just a dispute, it will be invoked at most t times during the whole multi-party computation, and thus contributes O M φ/n) + O(n 3 φ) · BC to the total communication complexity.
The Computation Phase
During the computation phase, values w need to be reconstructed, where each w is a linear combination of the global base sharings. This job is divided into n 2 segments, where in each segment, m = (c M + c O )/n 2 such values w need to be reconstructed. These values w are in general determined adaptively, i.e., depend on previously reconstructed values, with the exact dependencies determined by the circuit. We assume here that the circuit is not too "narrow" so that in each segment seg, the set W seg of shared values to be reconstructed can be divided into m/N blocks W 1 , . . . , W m/N of average size N = nκ each, so that the values of each block only depend on the values of the previous blocks, and thus can be reconstructed simultaneously.
The w 's are reconstructed block-wise by some designated player, and after each block, it is verified that he reconstructed correctly. If some fault is detected, then the players try to detect the cause of the fault; this is tedious but in the end rather straightforward. If this leads to a new dispute between two players, then these two players are added to Disp and the segment is repeated.
Protocol Rec
Let PK (the "king") be the first player not in Corr. Sequentially, for each block W k (where k = 1, . . . , m/N ), consisting of sharings w 1 , . . . , w N to be reconstructed, the following block-reconstruction and block-verification sub-protocols are performed. If one of these blocks fails for some player Pi (as specified below), then in all the subsequent blocks, he sends some default symbol ⊥ for every message he is supposed to send (instead of the actual message).
Block-reconstruction: Every player not in Disp K sends his shares of [w 1 ], . . . , [w N ] to PK . If all the sharings (not counting shares of players in Disp K ) form correct degree-t Shamir sharings (this includes receiving no ⊥ as share), then PK reconstructs and sends w 1 , . . . , w N to all the players not in Corr, using a relay for the players in Disp K . Otherwise, PK sends ⊥ instead, and the block fails for him. Block-verification: The following is done for every player PV (acting as verifier). PV chooses a random λV ∈ K and sends it to every player not in Disp V , and every player not in Disp V sends his share of [ω V ] = k λ k V [w k ] to V . If these shares lie on a degree-t polynomial and reconstruct to ω V = k λ k V w k , then PV accepts the reconstruction of this block; otherwise, this block fails for PV .
At then end, every player PV broadcasts "ok" if no block failed for him, or else broadcasts "fault". In case all players broadcast "ok", Rec halts. Otherwise, the following fault localization is performed.
Fault localization: Every player PV that broadcasted "fault", broadcasts the index k for the smallest block W k that failed for him, together with an identifier that specifies the cause of the failure, i.e., whether (1) he received ⊥ from PK instead of w 1 , . . . , w N , (2) he received ⊥ from some player Pi instead of the share ω V i , (3) the shares do not form a correct sharing, or (4) the shares do not reconstruct to ω V = k λ k V w k . Now, a fixed verifying player PV is chosen among all PV ∈ Corr that broadcasted the smallest value for k. If there is such a PV with PV ∈ Disp K among those, then the first with this property is selected; otherwise, the first among all (that broadcasted the smallest value for k). Depending on the identifier this PV broadcasted, one of the following is performed (where the case number corresponds to the above enumeration) for the smallest block k PV complained about.
Case 1: If PV ∈ Disp K , and hence he had received ⊥ from his relay (which by choice of PV has not complained about this block), PV and his relay are added to Disp and Rec halts. Otherwise, i.e. if PV ∈ Disp K , the players proceed as follows. If PK had not sent ⊥ to PV (but w 1 , . . . , w N ), then PK broadcasts "accuse PV ", and {PK , PV } is added to Disp and Rec halts. Otherwise, PK broadcasts the index k of the first sharing [w k ] for which the reconstruction failed. The players not in Corr then need to broadcast their shares of [w k ]. If these shares form a correct sharing, then PK broadcasts "accuse Pi", where Pi ∈ Disp K is a player that had sent a different share to PK during the block-reconstruction procedure, and {PK , Pi} is added to Disp and Rec halts. Otherwise, i.e. if the shares do not form a correct sharing, the players identify a corrupt player Pj ∈ Corr, and Pj is added to Corr and Rec halts. Identifying Pj is done by taking a new o from O, broadcasting the shares of [w k ] + [o], and by applying AnalyzeSharing to w = w k + o or w = o , depending on which is incorrect. Case 2: PV broadcasts "accuse Pi", where Pi ∈ Disp V is a player that had sent ⊥ to PV instead of a share, and {PV , Pi} is added to Disp and Rec halts. Case 3: PV broadcasts λV . If a player Pi ∈ Disp V had received a different value for λV during block-verification, then he broadcasts "accuse PV ", and {Pi, PV } is added to Disp and Rec halts. Otherwise, every player Pi ∈ Disp V sends his shares w , and, as in case 1, use AnalyzeSharing to identify a corrupt player Pj ∈ Corr, and Pj is added to Corr and Rec halts. Case 4: If PV ∈ Disp K , and hence he had received w 1 , . . . , w N from his relay (which by choice of PV has not complained about this block), PV and his relay are added to Disp and Rec halts. Otherwise, {PV , PK } is added to Disp and Rec halts.
Protocol Rec (including a possible call to fault localization, given below) requires m/N · O(N nφ + n 2 κ) = O(mnφ) bits of communication, plus O(n) broadcasts. In case the circuit is "narrow" so that the blocks W k need to be chosen smaller than specified above, then the communication amounts to O(mnφ) bits plus an additional O(n 2 κ) bits per block. Note that in total (over all segments), the number of blocks is bounded by the multiplicative depth d M of the circuit.
Fact 12
Except with probability mn/2 κ , at the end of Rec the uncorrupt players hold the correct openings of all w ∈ W seg or fault localization is performed. In the latter case, a new dispute is found. Also, the adversary learns no information beyond w and what he already knows and/or can simulate himself.
Conclusion
We showed that MPC with unconditional security against t < n/2 corrupt players is possible with amortized asymptotic near-linear communication complexity O(n log n) bits per multiplication gate for binary circuits. For circuits over a bigger field F, the log n term is replaced by max{log n, log |F}. This matches the communication complexity of the best scheme in the much simpler honest-but-curious setting. Room for improvement exists in the terms of the communication complexity that are circuit-size independent, for instance in the O(n 7 κ) term. Improving this term permits the amortization to step in for smaller circuits.
